Restitution by YIP, Man
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 
6-2019 
Restitution 
Man YIP 
Singapore Management University, manyip@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons 
Citation 
YIP, Man. Restitution. (2019). Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of Singapore Cases. 19, 705-720. 
Research Collection School Of Law. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/3080 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an 
authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, 
please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 (2018) 19 SAL Ann Rev 705 
 (Published on e-First 17 June 2019)  
 
23. RESTITUTION 
YIP Man 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxon); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, 
Singapore Management University. 
Introduction 
23.1 The year 2018 produced only a handful of cases on the law of 
unjust enrichment and restitution. However, two are seminal cases and 
of note to the entire common law world: Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua 
Siok Lui1 (“Ochroid”) and Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong 
Hua2 (“Turf Club”). Ochroid dealt with the hotly debated topic of the 
illegality defence against a claim in unjust enrichment for the recovery 
of money paid pursuant to an illegal contract. Rejecting the newly 
formulated Patel v Mirza3 approach under English law, the Court of 
Appeal in Ochroid set Singapore law on a different path, leaving a 
number of questions that need to be addressed in future cases. Turf 
Club, on the other hand, laid down the principles concerning the 
availability of Wrotham Park damages for breach of contract under 
Singapore law. Converging with English law, it rejected the 
restitutionary account of the award and, diverging from English law, it 
enunciated a different framework of analysis. 
23.2 The last case this chapter examines is the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd4 
(“Benzline”). The dispute concerned the recovery of an advance 
payment paid in anticipation of a contract that was not ultimately 
concluded. The claim was brought in unjust enrichment on the ground 
of “failure of consideration”. The decision illustrates that there are no 
“hard and fast” rules on the proper characterisation of a deposit 
payment and the determination of the basis of the transaction – much 
would depend on the facts of the case before the court. 
                                                          
1 [2018] 1 SLR 363. 
2 [2018] 2 SLR 655. 
3 [2017] AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42. 
4 [2018] 1 SLR 239. 
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Ochroid: Clarifying availability of restitution where contract is illegal 
23.3 The dispute in Ochroid arose from a series of agreements 
entered into between the parties that were, on the face of the contracts, 
concerned with the appellants making an investment – through the 
provision of “loans” – in the respondents’ business. These “loans”, 
according to the agreements, were to be repaid at a later specified date 
with a “profit”. The agreements were supported by tax invoices issued by 
the respondents stating the kind, quantity and price of goods to which 
they related. Parties conceded that the agreements were not “entirely 
proper” and that the tax invoices were fabricated documents which did 
not relate to genuine transactions performed by the respondents.5 
23.4 The Court of Appeal, agreeing with the High Court, found on 
the evidence that these agreements were disguised as part of a joint 
venture investment and that the appellants (and the second appellant’s 
wife) had in fact always intended the transactions to be loans. As the 
appellants were unlicensed moneylenders, the Court of Appeal, 
upholding the High Court’s decision, ruled that these agreements were 
in contravention of the Moneylenders Act6 and thus unenforceable. 
23.5 The follow-on issue that the court had to address was whether 
the claim in unjust enrichment for the recovery of the moneys paid 
under these unenforceable moneylending contracts should be allowed.7 
In dealing with this claim, the court had to consider the impact that the 
contractual illegality had on an independent unjust enrichment claim 
and more broadly, therefore, to clarify the Singapore position on the 
illegality defence. In particular, the court would have to confront with 
the question of whether Singapore law should follow the “range of 
factors” approach enunciated by the majority of the UK Supreme Court 
in Patel v Mirza.8 
Current English approach: Patel v Mirza 
23.6 By way of background, Patel v Mirza marked a “pivotal 
moment” in English private law9 – it overruled the technical reliance 
approach in Tinsley v Milligan10 and opted for a discretionary approach. 
                                                          
5 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [10]. 
6 Cap 188, 1985 Rev Ed. 
7 There was also the issue of whether the appellants succeeded in establishing their 
claims in fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud against the 
respondents. However, the author will prescind from an analysis of this issue. 
8 See para 23.1 above. 
9 James Goudkamp, “The End of an Era? Illegality in Private Law in the Supreme 
Court” (2017) 133 LQR 14. 
10 [1994] 1 AC 340. 
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The case concerned a claim in unjust enrichment for sums paid 
pursuant to an illegal agreement for insider trading. As it turned out, the 
anticipated insider information did not become available. The Supreme 
Court allowed the claim, although the panel of nine was divided as to 
what the applicable test was. Lord Toulson, delivering the majority 
judgment,11 rejected a “mechanistic process”.12 He enunciated three 
categories of factors that the court should take into account in its 
exercise of discretion: the purpose of the prohibition; other relevant 
public policies; and proportionality.13 He further commented that 
applying the “range of factors” discretionary approach would mean that 
it would “be rare” for an unjust enrichment claim to be barred on the 
basis of illegality.14 In respect of the unjust enrichment claim brought 
before the Supreme Court, Lord Toulson said:15 
… no particular reason has been advanced … to justify Mr Mirza’s 
retention of the monies beyond the fact that it was paid to him for the 
unlawful purpose of placing an insider bet. 
23.7 In Patel v Mirza, Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke 
agreed), considered the majority’s approach to be productive of 
uncertainty and would thus lead to “wasteful and unnecessary 
litigation”.16 He was in favour of a rule-based approach to illegality. 
Whilst he appreciated that parties who intend to engage in illegal 
activities may not study the case law to derive predictable patterns, 
Lord Sumption stressed that their legal advisers would desire certainty 
in the law so as to advise these parties on the effects of the relevant 
transactions.17 In his view, although certainty is not the only value to be 
pursued in law, it is a pinnacle value of contract law.18 Nor did he think 
that an evaluative approach was necessary. He was of the view that the 
exceptions to the reliance principle, countervailing policies that require 
the award of a remedy in certain cases, as well as the wider availability of 
                                                          
11 Comprising Lords Kerr, Wilson, Hodge and Lady Hale. Lord Neuberger expressed 
some support for Lord Toulson’s approach. The minority consisted of 
Lords Sumption, Clarke and Mance. 
12 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 at [101]. 
13 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 at [101]. 
14 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 at [101]. 
15 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 at [121]. 
16 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 at [263]. 
17 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 at [263]. 
18 Cf James Allsop, Singapore Academy of Law Distinguished Speaker Lecture 2017 
“The Doctrine of Penalties in Modern Contract Law” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 1 at 4. 
Allsop observed: 
Normative values lie at the heart of the doctrine because (as with many legal 
principles) the doctrine is seeking to vindicate the human and experiential in 
the law – the law’s humanity. This sometimes is lost sight of in the grasping 
for certainty by use of abstracted or theoretical rules in taxonomical structures 
in order to define doctrine in concrete form. 
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restitution, would mitigate the harshness of the operation of the 
principle.19 More importantly, similarly disagreeing with a technical 
application of the reliance principle, Lord Sumption explained that the 
outcome in Tinsley v Milligan could be justified differently:20 
The true principle is that the application of the illegality principle 
depends on what facts the court must be satisfied about in order to 
find an intention giving rise to an equitable interest. It does not 
depend on how those facts are established. Ms Milligan was entitled to 
the interest which she claimed in the property because she paid half of 
the price and there was no intention to make a gift. That was all that 
the court needed to be satisfied about. 
23.8 As such, on Lord Sumption’s analysis, a party’s reliance on 
illegality merely for evidentiary purposes would not necessarily defeat 
its claim. Applying his reinterpretation of the reliance principle, 
allowing the unjust enrichment claim in the dispute before the Supreme 
Court would not “give effect to the illegal act or to any right derived 
from it”.21 On the contrary, allowing the restitutionary claim would 
return the parties to their pre-transaction position “where they should 
have always been”.22 
23.9 Notably, in Patel v Mirza, the majority did not have to address 
the issue of whether Mirza could invoke the locus poenitentiae exception 
to justify his entitlement to restitution. In any event, an evaluative 
approach that explicitly addresses the policy considerations – of which 
the “range of factors” approach is certainly an example – does not need 
to rely on technical exceptions such as the locus poenitentiae principle, as 
these exceptions are merely “(inflexible) embodiments” of the relevant 
policy considerations.23 The policy considerations may be directly 
examined under the “range of factors” approach.24 Lords Neuberger and 
Sumption, however, consider the exception to be still relevant under 
English law. A long-held debate concerning this exception related to 
whether the withdrawal from the illegal project in question needs to be 
penitent (or voluntary)25 or not.26 On the facts of Patel v Mirza, the 
parties did not eventually carry out their illegal enterprise because of 
external circumstances (the non-availability of insider information), as 
                                                          
19 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42 at [264]. 
20 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42 at [238]. 
21 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42 at [268]. 
22 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42 at [268]. 
23 Man Yip, “The Restitutionary Aftermath of Contractual Illegality” [2015] RLR 106 
at 119. 
24 Graham Virgo, “Patel v Mirza: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back” (2016) 
22 T&T 1090 at 1097. 
25 See, eg, Bigos v Bousted [1951] 1 All ER 92. 
26 See Tribe v Tribe [1996] Ch 107 at 135. 
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opposed to their voluntary withdrawal. Importantly, to say that the 
exception requires penitent withdrawal is to say that the law looks at the 
moral merit of the parties. Lord Sumption did not think that the law 
should introduce “a spurious moral gloss on the principle” of locus 
poenitentiae by requiring that the withdrawal be penitent/voluntary.27 
Ochroid: Rejection of discretionary approach in favour of rule-based 
approach 
23.10 Turning back to Ochroid,28 the Court of Appeal flatly declined to 
follow the Patel v Mirza “range of factors” approach on the grounds that 
it introduces unprincipled discretion and uncertainty and is unnecessary 
to achieve remedial justice.29 The court reaffirmed the approach laid 
down in Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo30 (“Ting Siew May”). Post-
Ochroid, under Singapore law, where contractual illegality is concerned, 
the Singapore courts will apply a two-stage approach. 
23.11 Under the first stage, the court will ask whether the contract is 
prohibited and the Ting Siew May principles will guide the court’s search 
for the answer to this question. If the contract is prohibited by statute or 
is found to be illegal at common law, there can be no recovery of 
benefits transferred under the contract in contract law. Ochroid’s 
contribution to the jurisprudence related to the clarification of the 
principles applying at the second stage concerning recovery of the 
benefits transferred under the illegal contract through an independent 
claim in unjust enrichment. 
23.12 At the second stage, the court emphasised that Ting Siew May 
has rejected a procedural and formal application of the reliance 
principle.31 Post-Ting Siew May, similar to Lord Sumption’s approach in 
Patel v Mirza, Singapore law applies a normative and substantive 
understanding of the reliance principle.32 In other words, the substantive 
reliance principle is only engaged (and offended) if one “seeks to directly 
enforce and profit from an illegal contract”; an independent claim in 
unjust enrichment for restitution of the benefits transferred under the 
contract would not offend the principle.33 
                                                          
27 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42 at [253]. 
28 See para 23.1 above. 
29 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [114]–[125]. 
30 [2014] 3 SLR 609. 
31 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [132]. 
32 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [137]. 
33 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [137]. 
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23.13 The court further clarified that restitution in unjust enrichment 
for benefits transferred under an illegal contract would ordinarily be 
available notwithstanding the illegality if the elements of the cause of 
action are made out.34 Importantly, illegality is not the operating 
unjust factor in such cases. The plaintiff would have to look at the facts 
and identify a recognised unjust factor, for example, failure of 
consideration.35 The court also affirmed that the independent claim in 
unjust enrichment is subject to the normal defences, such as change of 
position.36 
Ochroid: Illegality defence to unjust enrichment claim – Concept of 
stultification 
23.14 The court then went on to consider the broader issue of the 
impact of illegality on the independent claim in unjust enrichment, 
which the court highlighted as a separate question from the impact of 
illegality on the underlying contract. In this connection, the court 
favoured37 Birks’ approach of anchoring the defence of illegality to an 
unjust enrichment claim in the concept of stultification.38 The core idea 
is this: there should be consistency between the different branches of the 
law. As such, the court must consider:39 
… whether allowing the claim in unjust enrichment would make 
nonsense of the law’s condemnation of the illegal contract in question 
and of its refusal to enforce the illegal contract. 
In particular, the court endorsed Birks’ “lever argument” and the “safety-
net argument” as relevant factors which the court should take into 
account in deciding the question of stultification: whether permitting 
the claim would “undermine the fundamental policy that rendered the 
underlying contract void and unenforceable in the first place” [emphasis 
in original].40 
23.15 The court also gave some obiter guidance on the scope of the 
concept of stultification as applied in other contexts, for example, in 
relation to an independent proprietary claim in tort law or in the law of 
trusts. The court tentatively suggested that if they do depart from the 
                                                          
34 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [139]. 
35 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [140]–[141]. 
36 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [142]. 
37 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [145] and [147]. 
38 Peter Birks, “Recovering Value Transferred under an Illegal Contract” (2000) 
1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 155. 
39 Peter Birks, “Recovering Value Transferred under an Illegal Contract” (2000) 
1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 155 at 202. 
40 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [158]. 
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technical reliance approach in Tinsley v Milligan41 in these proprietary 
contexts, the court retains the power to bar the independent property 
claim by applying the principle of stultification.42 
23.16 This part of the Ochroid judgment warrants two comments. 
First, there is no basis to apply the procedural/technical application of 
the reliance principle in the proprietary context, given the reasons for its 
rejection in the non-proprietary context. As such, the abolition of the 
Tinsley v Milligan approach seems inevitable. Second, the court, as it has 
acknowledged in Ochroid,43 appears keen to lay down a coherent 
approach to the law relating to recovery of benefits/proprietary interests 
pursuant to an independent cause of action. Indeed, as has been 
observed elsewhere, Australian law has already achieved a coherent 
approach to illegality in private law.44 English law, save in the area of 
torts,45 has also propounded a coherent (albeit controversial) approach 
to illegality in private law post-Patel v Mirza. The Singapore law’s 
aspiration appears slightly more modest (and understandably cautious): 
to lay down a coherent approach for the recovery of benefits/rights by 
an independent cause of action where the underlying contract is illegal. 
It remains to be seen, as local case law continues to develop, whether 
Singapore law would take on a more ambitious scope in its reform of the 
illegality principles in private law. Third, whilst the principle of 
stultification appears to be a “hard and fast” rule, the principle in 
operation requires the court to engage in an exercise of deciding 
whether allowing the claim would undermine the policy of the law 
which gives rise to the illegality in question. This is neither a 
straightforward nor simple exercise. Where the illegality arises in 
respect of an underlying contract, the Ting Siew May two-stage 
approach would be employed, and the principle of stultification operates 
at the second stage in determining whether the independent claim 
should be allowed. Where the facts do not involve an underlying illegal 
contract (as in the case of Tinsley v Milligan), it appears that the 
outcome of the case would depend solely on the application of the 
principle of stultification. More guidance from the courts is required. 
                                                          
41 See para 23.6 above. 
42 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [168]. 
43 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [158]. 
44 Man Yip, “The Restitutionary Aftermath of Contractual Illegality” [2015] RLR 106 
at 119. 
45 Cf Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA 
Civ 1841; [2018] 3 WLR 1651 at [87]–[91]. In the view that Patel v Mirza [2017] 
AC 467; [2016] UKSC 42 (“Patel”) raised contractual and unjust enrichment 
issues, the Court of Appeal held that the Patel test did not apply to a claim against 
another for negligence by an individual who killed her mother while undergoing a 
psychotic episode. The case was appealed before the UK Supreme Court and the 
judgment is expected to be released shortly. 
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Ochroid: Not in pari delicto; locus poenitentiae 
23.17 Finally, by way of providing obiter guidance for future disputes, 
the court expressed some views on the application of the legal principles 
of “not in pari delicto” (parties not being equally at fault) and locus 
poenitentiae – the traditionally recognised exceptions to the technical 
reliance principle. 
23.18 On the not in pari delicto principle, the court said that the law is 
“relatively well-settled” and that it would apply to situations such as class 
protection statutes; fraud, duress or oppression; and where the 
transaction was entered into as a result of mistake.46 The court 
highlighted that some of these situations which bring the not in pari 
delicto principle into play would also give rise to recognised “unjust 
factors” to constitute the cause of action in unjust enrichment. In these 
cases of overlap, the court clarified that the stultification concept is 
inapplicable because awarding restitution to a less blameworthy plaintiff 
would not undermine the fundamental policy of the law and in some 
cases, the award would indeed further the policy of the law. 
23.19 It would be difficult to disagree with the court’s observations. 
However, case law in other common law jurisdictions reveals that courts 
have treated parties as not being equally at fault in other situations: 
for example, where one party is a lay person and the other is a solicitor, 
and the dispute centered on the latter’s breach of professional rules.47 It 
was said that the lay person was less at fault because he could not be 
presumed to have knowledge of the prohibition in the professional rules. 
Another example would be where the relevant legislative regime 
imposes the obligation of compliance on one party and that party’s 
non-compliance was said to be an instance of being more at fault than 
the other party.48 In this connection, it has been suggested that courts 
should more openly investigate the interface between the in pari delicto 
elements of the case with the relevant background statute(s) in its 
reasoning as to why the principle of in pari delicto supports an award of 
restitution.49 In cases involving statutes protecting a weaker class of 
persons, restitution should be allowed not because the defendant is 
actually more blameworthy than the plaintiff (as a person falling within 
the statutorily identified weaker class), but because the statutory policy 
requires/supports it. This justification does not readily (or always) apply 
                                                          
46 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [170]. At [43], the court 
seemed to confine the application of the not in pari delicto principle to just these 
three categories. 
47 Mohamed v Alga & Co [2000] 1 WLR 1815. 
48 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7. 
49 Man Yip, “The Restitutionary Aftermath of Contractual Illegality” [2015] RLR 106 
at 111. 
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to other cases where the court is actively canvassing the facts to 
determine who is more at fault in fact. In Turf Club,50 the court 
indicated that the not in pari delicto principle “does not entail a broad 
examination of the relative blameworthiness of each party”.51 This 
suggests that Singapore law may not follow the path laid by the courts of 
other common law jurisdictions. 
23.20 As to the locus poenitentiae exception, differing from Lord 
Sumption’s preferred approach, the court favoured a narrow account of 
the exception that is rooted in moral merit – that is to say, the 
withdrawal must be penitent.52 According to the court, this narrow 
account is consistent “with the policy of the law that people should be 
encouraged to withdraw from their illegal projects” and only in such 
situations would restitutionary awards pose “no threat of stultification”.53 
Application to facts 
23.21 Given the court’s conclusion under the first stage that the 
agreements were prohibited and unenforceable under the Moneylenders 
Act, the question under stage two was brought into play: whether the 
payments made under these unenforceable agreements could be 
recovered by an independent claim in unjust enrichment. The court was 
of the view that the elements of the claim were made out – in particular, 
the applicable unjust factor was failure of consideration.54 
23.22 The court, however, ruled that the claim in unjust enrichment 
would be barred by the operation of the stultification principle. This is 
because the recovery of the principal sums would undermine the 
“fundamental social and public policy against unlicensed moneylending 
which undergirds the [Moneylenders Act]”.55 
Ochroid approach and “range of factors” approach compared 
23.23 For completeness, it is helpful to compare the Ochroid two-stage 
approach against the Patel “range of factors” approach. In Ochroid, the 
Court of Appeal iterated that the Ochroid approach towards contractual 
illegality under stage one confines the exercise of discretion only in 
relation to the category of contracts which are not prohibited (expressly 
or impliedly) by statute per se, but are nevertheless illegal for being 
                                                          
50 See para 23.1 above. 
51 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [43]. 
52 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [174]. 
53 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [174]. 
54 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [214]. 
55 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [219]. 
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entered into with the object of committing an illegal act.56 In respect of 
the aforesaid category of contracts, the court is to assess what would be a 
proportionate response by reference to a list of policy factors:57 
(a) whether allowing the claim would undermine the purpose of 
the prohibiting rule; (b) the nature and gravity of the illegality; (c) the 
remoteness or centrality of the illegality to the contract; (d) the object, 
intent, and conduct of the paties; and (e) the consequences of denying 
the claim … 
The court said that the “range of factors approach”, by contrast, would be 
applied “across the board in all cases of illegality at common law” 
[emphasis in original].58 In the court’s view, thus, the Ochroid approach 
tolerates a more limited degree of discretion, as compared with the 
Patel v Mirza “range of factors” approach. It should follow that any 
uncertainty arising from the balancing exercise would be more 
constrained under the Ochroid approach. Indeed, under stage two, 
Singapore returns to a rule-based approach (the principle of 
stultification) in deciding whether benefits transferred under the 
unenforceable contract may be recovered by an independent cause of 
action. 
Turf Club: Endorsing a compensatory account of Wrotham Park 
damages 
23.24 The author now turns to consider Turf Club.59 In that case, the 
plaintiffs and defendants were involved in a venture project to develop 
land that was subject to a state lease granted to the defendants. Under 
this project, the defendants would grant subleases to the joint venture 
companies, which would in turn let the premises out for income. 
A shareholder dispute subsequently arose between the parties while the 
site was being developed, but it was eventually settled. The settlement 
agreement (recorded in a consent order) provided for a bidding exercise, 
pursuant to which the higher bidder would buy over the lower bidder’s 
shares; and the parties behind the lower bid would then resign from 
office of directorship. The point of this process was to enable a clean 
break between the parties. However, before the bidding exercise took 
place, the defendants, on obtaining a renewal of the state lease, refused 
to grant corresponding subleases to the joint venture companies as they 
previously did. The development resulted in a substantial diminution of 
the companies’ share value, thereby frustrating the bidding exercise. The 
                                                          
56 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [39]. 
57 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [38]. 
58 Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363 at [40]. 
59 See para 23.1 above. 
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plaintiffs thus brought a number of claims against the defendants, 
including breach of contract. The Court of Appeal found that 
repudiatory breaches of contract were established in an earlier 
decision.60 In Turf Club, the Court of Appeal dealt with, amongst other 
issues, the question of what remedies should be awarded for the 
breaches of contract. In this connection, the parties focused on the 
nature and applicability of an award of Wrotham Park damages, as well 
as a disgorgement award, as they were in agreement that it would be 
difficult to quantify the financial loss caused by the contractual 
breaches.61 For the purpose of the present discussion, the author will 
focus on the Wrotham Park damages award. 
23.25 The court affirmed that Singapore law recognises Wrotham Park 
damages. Converging with English law, the court endorsed a 
compensatory account of the award.62 But declining to follow the 
English approach established in One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris-
Garner,63 the court said that under Singapore law, there are three 
requirements for the award of Wrotham Park damages for breach of 
contract. First, the award would only be ordered if there is a “remedial 
lacuna”. In short, a remedial lacuna occurs where the plaintiff has 
sustained no financial loss for which traditional compensation may be 
awarded and specific relief is unavailable on the facts of the case. 
Second, as a general rule, a breach of negative covenant must be 
established. Thirdly, the hypothetical bargain, on which the award is 
measured, must not be one that is “irrational or unrealistic” for parties 
to make.64 
23.26 Applied to the facts, the court held that the Wrotham Park 
damages claim failed because the plaintiffs were not able to establish the 
first and the third requirements. The court ordered traditional 
compensation for breach of contract instead. A comparison between the 
Singapore and English approaches has been undertaken elsewhere.65 
For now, the author will turn to focus on the court’s rejection of a 
restitutionary account of Wrotham Park damages for breach of contract. 
                                                          
60 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2017] 2 SLR 12. 
61 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [91]. 
62 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [179]. 
63 [2018] UKSC 20; [2018] 2 WLR 1353. 
64 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [246]. 
65 Man Yip & Alvin W-L See, “One Step Away from Morris-Garner: Wrotham Park 
Damages in Singapore” (2019) 135 LQR 36. 
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Nature of Wrotham Park damages for breach of contract 
23.27 Unlike English law which has for some time endorsed a 
compensatory account of Wrotham Park damages,66 the position under 
Singapore law was unsettled before the Turf Club decision. In fact, the 
Court of Appeal’s obiter comments in ACES System Development Pte 
Ltd v Yenty Lily67 (“Yenty Lily”) appear to favour a restitutionary analysis 
of the user principle.68 To recall, the user principle measures damages on 
the basis of reasonable hire of the property that has been unlawfully 
detained or used by the defendant. The user awards are generally 
considered as closely related to Wrotham Park damages. 
23.28 In Turf Club, the court explained that Wrotham Park damages 
are descriptively restitutionary but not normatively restitutionary.69 In 
essence, the Wrotham Park awards measures compensation by reference 
to the defendant’s gains (restitutionary in a descriptive sense) but the 
rationale for the award is not based on the goals of punishment and 
deterrence (restitutionary in a normative sense). The court pointed out 
that the goal of punishment is generally inconsistent with the law of 
contract.70 The court further distinguished Wrotham Park damages for 
breach of contract from the disgorgement award ordered in Attorney-
General v Blake71 (“Blake”).72 The former remedy does not involve the 
partial disgorgement of the defendant’s actual gains. According to the 
court, the defendant’s actual gains may be considered in the assessment 
of the Wrotham Park damages “merely as a matter of evidence in 
providing a good estimate of the anticipated profit at the time of the 
breach” [emphasis in original]. 73 Indeed, the court commented that the 
loss for which Wrotham Park damages are awarded to compensate is 
“the loss of the performance interest itself” [emphasis in original], as 
opposed to pecuniary loss.74 
23.29 As for Yenty Lily, the court insisted that its views on the nature 
of the Wrotham Park damages for breach of contract do not contradict 
the views expressed in the earlier case in relation to the user principle.75 
                                                          
66 Cf Marathon Asset Management LLP v Seddon [2017] EWHC 300 (Comm); [2017] 
ICR 791 at [198]. 
67 [2013] 4 SLR 1317. 
68 (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 477–480, paras 22.33–22.40. 
69 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [191]. 
70 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [198]. 
See also PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd [2017] 
2 SLR 129 at [135]. 
71 [2001] 1 AC 268. 
72 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [199]. 
73 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [199]. 
74 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [199]. 
75 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [212]. 
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The reconciliation appeared to proceed on the basis that the court’s 
reference to “restitution” in Yenty Lily was a reference to descriptive 
restitution, as opposed to normative restitution.76 The court, however, 
did not go on to endorse a compensatory account of the award. It merely 
distanced the user awards from a normatively restitutionary analysis. It 
is not clear that the court would be prepared to characterise user 
damages as compensation. It regarded user damages as awards to 
“[protect] property rights in themselves”77 [emphasis in original] – 
language which is not at first sight in line with compensation for any 
form of loss. It remains to be seen how the court would characterise user 
awards when the issue is brought squarely before it in future litigation. 
23.30 Finally, it should not be missed that the court considered78 its 
categories of “descriptive restitution” and “normative restitution” as 
corresponding directly to James Edelman’s two categories of restitution: 
restitutionary damages and disgorgement damages.79 This observation 
merits some brief remarks. Edelman’s taxonomy of restitution is not 
based on normative reasoning (deterrence or corrective justice); it is 
based on the phenomenon of assessing monetary awards by reference to 
the defendant’s gains. The label “restitution”, used in either category, is 
thus legally significant, even though it is descriptive of the awards being 
gains-focused. The law of restitution – whether arising in response to 
the event of unjust enrichment, to reverse transfers of value in the 
context of wrongs, or for the purpose of disgorging gains made by the 
defendant by reason of his wrongdoing – is focused on gains received by 
the defendant. As he explains in his monograph:80 
The response of restitution, reversing as a result of unjust enrichment, 
therefore operates in an identical manner to restitutionary damages 
which reverse transfers as a result of wrongs. 
On the other hand, the court’s use of the label “restitution” in the true 
legal sense post-Turf Club appears to be very restrictive, referring only 
to awards for the disgorgement of profits. This brings to question 
whether “restitution for unjust enrichment” is truly (normatively) 
restitution or merely descriptive restitution, or something else 
altogether. The terminology of “descriptive restitution” and “normative 
restitution” is also likely to cause confusion. 
                                                          
76 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [213]. 
77 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [213]. 
78 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [186]. 
79 James Edelman, Gains-Based Damages (Hart Publishing, 2002) ch 3. 
80 James Edelman, Gains-Based Damages (Hart Publishing, 2002) ch 3 at p 93. 
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Blake damages 
23.31 In Turf Club, the court also made provisional observations on 
the availability of Blake disgorgement awards under Singapore law. It 
observed that:81 
… the primary difficulty with recognising AG v Blake damages as a 
part of Singapore law is the uncertainty of the legal criteria to be 
applied in awarding such damages. [emphasis in original] 
The court highlighted that the concept of “legitimate interest” is “rather 
general and perhaps even vague”.82 The court suggested that it may be 
possible to rationalise Blake damages as “an exceptional remedy” 
[emphasis in original] confined to cases where the law has a legitimate 
basis – upholding public interest/governmental interest that “go beyond 
the private interests of the parties themselves” – for punishing the 
defendant and or deterring non-performance of the contractual 
obligation.83 Alternatively, the court considered that it may be possible 
to reinterpret Blake as a case of awarding an account of profits for 
breach of a quasi-fiduciary obligation.84 
23.32 On either rationalisation, the court’s message is clear: going 
forward, Blake damages, if they are to be recognised as part of Singapore 
law, would be “confined to truly exceptional cases” [emphasis in 
original].85 More generally, it appears that Singapore courts would not 
allow the law of restitution, which was developed belatedly, to 
indiscriminately disturb the established remedial regime of contract law. 
Benzline: Characterisation of deposits and failure of consideration 
23.33 Benzline86 is the third and last judgment that will be considered 
in this chapter. The High Court decision87 has been examined in a 
previous review.88 The claim concerned the recovery of a payment made 
in advance of the execution of a contract which was not ultimately 
concluded. Benzline held the Singapore master dealership rights for 
Lorinser cars, which were manufactured by Daimler AG. While the 
                                                          
81 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [252]. 
82 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [253]. See 
generally Solene Rowan, “The ‘Legitimate Interest in Performance’ in the Law on 
Penalties” (2019) Camb LJ (forthcoming). 
83 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [254]. 
84 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [255]. 
85 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655 at [255]. 
86 See para 23.2 above. 
87 Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd v Benzline Auto Pte Ltd [2016] SGHC 281. 
88 (2016) 17 SAL Ann Rev 614 at 628, paras 23.43–23.45 and 23.50–23.52. 
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parties to the dispute, Benzline and Supercars, were undergoing 
negotiations for an exclusive car sub-dealership agreement, Supercars 
ordered a batch of cars with Benzline. After the receipt of the first draft 
of the agreement to be entered into between Benzline and Lorinser – 
which was intended to form the basis of the sub-dealership agreement 
between Benzline and Supercars89 – Supercars (the plaintiffs) made an 
advance payment to Benzline in respect of its orders, pursuant to 
Benzline’s request. Benzline and Supercars eventually failed to conclude 
the anticipated exclusive sub-dealership agreement by reason of their 
disagreements, including a disagreement pertaining to a clause which 
required Supercars to provide a stand-by letter of credit to Lorinser. 
Supercars sued Benzline to recover the advance payment in unjust 
enrichment on the ground of failure of consideration. Benzline argued 
that the advance payment amounted to part payment for Supercars’ 
order of cars and was thus non-refundable. 
23.34 The Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court’s ruling that 
the advance payment was to be characterised as a payment to show good 
faith and seriousness and was thus recoverable when the anticipated 
contract was not concluded. The Court of Appeal was of the view that 
the payment was made by Supercars to avoid delay in the supply of cars 
which it ordered. The evidence showed that Benzline had urgently asked 
Supercars for the payment as it was under pressure to pay Lorinser, who 
needed the funds to pay the required deposit to Daimler AG for 
Daimler AG to commence manufacturing of the cars ordered by 
Supercars.90 It was clear that neither Benzline nor Lorinser was willing to 
pay Daimler first. Based on the communications between the parties, 
Supercars was also aware of the reason why the advance payment was 
requested.91 
23.35 As to the basis of the advance payment, the court stressed that 
“not every expectation which a party has in making a transfer forms 
part of the basis of that transfer”.92 The basis must be objectively 
determined based on the communications exchanged between the 
parties; subjective thoughts of the parties which had not been 
communicated would be disregarded.93 Whilst accepting that the basis 
of the transfer may be implied, the court said that: 94 
                                                          
89 They were meant to be back-to-back agreements. 
90 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [65]. 
91 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [61]. 
92 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [51]. 
93 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [51]. 
94 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [51]. 
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… implication must be based on objective features of the transfer and 
its context, and not merely on a fortuitous overlap between the 
unexpressed expectations of the parties. 
The court further accepted that there may be more than one basis to a 
transfer.95 
23.36 On the facts, the court found that there was no express 
understanding between the parties that the conclusion of the exclusive 
sub-dealership agreement formed part of the basis of the payment.96 
Instead, the court found that the implied basis of the transfer was that 
Benzline would offer Supercars the exclusive sub-dealership agreement 
“on terms which correspond in material ways” to the draft agreement 
between Benzline and Lorinser, a copy of which was supplied to 
Supercars.97 This is because Supercars made the advance payment after 
“having had sight” of the draft agreement between Benzline and 
Lorinser, which indicated that the terms in the said draft were on the 
whole acceptable to Supercars.98 
23.37 Having determined the implied basis of the transfer, the court 
ruled that the basis did not fail in the case. In the court’s words, whilst 
Benzline was prepared to move forward with the exclusive sub-
dealership agreement, “it was Supercars which threw a spanner in the 
works” by refusing to provide the required stand-by letter of credit and 
thereafter suggesting that it contract directly with Lorinser instead.99 
23.38 Finally, it is also important to note that the court proceeded 
with its reasoning on the basis that the law requires total failure of 
consideration. It, however, explicitly caveated that it did so without 
“necessarily foreclosing the possibility of future developments” under 
Singapore law to recognise partial failure of consideration.100 
                                                          
95 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [52]. 
96 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [67]. 
97 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [68]. 
98 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [68]. 
99 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [69]. 
100 Benzline Auto Pte Ltd v Supercars Lorinser Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 239 at [54]. 
